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SPECIAL BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS AS DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
Our question is the validity of special assesments as affected
by the following clause of the Federal Constitution:
"* * * No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'
(Italics mine.)
The phrase "due process of law" occurs also in the Fifth Amend-
ment, as follows:
"No person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law * * * " (Italics mine.)
Authority of Cases Under Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment restricts the United States, whereas
the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the states. It has been inti-
mated that the cases under the one would not be necessarily binding
as to the other. In F ight vs. Davidson,2 the majority opinion calls
attention to the fact that Norwood vs. Baker3 was under the Four-
teenth Amendment and says:
"But it by no means necessarily follows that a long and
consistent construction put upon the Fifth Amendment, and
maintaining the validity of the Acts of Congress relatihg to
public improvements within the District of Columbia, is to
be deemed overruled by a decision concerning-the operation
of the Fourteenth Amendment as controlling state legislation.'"
The dissenting opinion combats this view with these words:
"It is inconceivable to me that the question whether a
person has been deprived of his property without due process
of law can be determined upon principles applicable under
the Fourteenth Amendment but not applicable under the
Fifth Amendment, or upon principles applicable under the
Fifth and not applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It seems to me that the words 'due process.of law' mean the
same in both Amendments."
'Fourteenth Amendment, section 1.
2181 U. S. 371, 384.
'(hereinafter referred to)
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In another case in the same volume4 the court states that the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to extend to citizens
and residents of the States the same protection aga~inst arbitrary
state legislation as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment against
similar legislation by Congress. The dissenting opinion concurs
heartily as to this point.'
Later decisions seem to make no distinction between the two
Amendments, so it is probably safe to rely on cases arising under
the Fourteenth Amendment as authority concerning the Fifth
Amendment, and vice versa.
Nature of Special Assessments.
The special assessment is held to be referable to the taxing
power.6
The choice of subjects of taxation is, generally speaking, a
matter of legislitive discretion.7
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in a recent
case:8
"A tax is an enforced contribution for payment of public
expenses. It is laid by some rule of apportionment according to
which the persons or property taxed share the public burden,
and whether taxation operates upon all within the State, or
upon those of a given class or locality, its essential nature is
the same. The power of segregation for taxing purposes has
every day illustration in the experience of local communities,
the members of which, by reason of their membership, or the
owners of property within the bounds of the political sub-
division are compelled to bear the burdens both of the successes
and of the failures of the local administration. When local
improvements may be deemed to result in special benefits,
a further classification may be made and special assessments
imposed accordingly, but even in such case there is no require-
ment of the Federal Constitution that for every payment there
'Tonawanda vs. Lyon, 181 U. S. 399.
'See also Cass Farm Co. vs. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, 398.
Detroit vs. Parker, 181 U. S. 399, 401.
French vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 329.
'Bauman vs. Ross, 167 U. S. 548.
11 Encyclopedia of U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 3.
Meier vs. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391.
Parsons vs. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45.
French vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324.
Garrett vs. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505.
'Mobile vs. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 1. c. 704.
$Houck vs. Little River Drainage District, 239 U. S. 254, 1. c. 265.
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must be an equal benefit. The State in its discretion may lay
such assessments in proportion to position, frontage, area,
market value, or to benefits estimated by commissioners."
In the case last cited a drainage district had been organized
under the statutes of Missouri and a preliminary tax of twenty-five
cents per acre levied in accordance with the statute on all the land
in the district, including the land which would ultimately be taken
for the purposes of the district and which could not, therefore, be
said to be benefited.
Upon the objection being raised that the assessment without
corresponding benefit was not due process of law, the court said
that it was not necessary to base the preliminary tax upon special
benefits, accuring from a completed plan, and that the exaction
was not such as could be considered as abuse of the State's dis-
cretion.
Validity of Legislative Assessment.
It is said that if an assessment by the legislature is palpably
arbitrary and a plain abuse, it will not be due process of law.'
An investigation of when the action of the State in assessing
the benefits will be considered as due process and when it will not
be so considered may best be pursued by a study of a few of the
leading cases in the United States Supreme Court.
Norwood vs. Baker.10 In this case, the village of Norwood passed
an ordinance to condemn a strip of land fifty feet wide through
the property of Ellen R. Baker. The statute of Ohio" gave the
council permission to assess the cost and expenses of opening any
street upon the abutting or contiguous lots according to several
methods, one of which was: "by the front foot of the property bound-
ing and abutting on the improvement * * * ." In the ordi-
nance, the council provided that not only the cost of the land taken,
but also the expenses, cost of advertising and of the condemnation
proceedings should be assessed on the property abutting on the
strip taken.
In other words, Mrs. Baker received nothing for the strip
taken and had to pay the expenses of the proceedings in addition.
The majority of the Supreme Court of the United States held that
9GAST REALTY CO. VS. SCHNEIDER GRANITE CO., 240 U. S. 55.10(1898) 172 U. S. 269.
U(1890) §2264.
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the proceeding was not due process of law. The decision, confined
to the facts, is still authoritative.12 .
However, let us examine the dicta. At page 291, the court
said:
"The assessment was by the front foot, and for a specific
sum, representing such cost, and that sum could not have
been reduced under the ordinance of the village, even if proof
had been made that the costs and expenses assessed upon the
abutting property exceeded the special benefits. The assess-
ment was in itself an illegal one because it rested on a basis
that excluded any consideration of benefits."
Again, the court says: 3
"In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of private
property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial
excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent
of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation of private
property for public use without compensation."
From this and other language in the opinion, it was thought
for a time that the mere fact that a rule was prescribed excluding
all inquiry into benefits was sufficient to render the proceeding a
taking of property without due process of law.14
French vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.'6 This case involved
the paving of a street in Kansas City, Missouri. In accordance with
the charter, the cost of the paving had been assessd as a special
tax on the property abutting the street in proportion to the front
feet. There was no hearing had or provided as to the apportioning
of the benefits. It was urged that the adoption of a rule which
precluded a hearing on the question of benefits was not due process
of law under the ruling in Norwood vs. Baker (supra). The majority
of the court held that this was not the necessary import of Norwood
vs. Baker, and distinguished it with these remarks:"
"That was a case where by a village ordinance, apparently
aimed at a single person, a portion of whose property was con-
demned for a street, the entire cost of opening the street, in-
"'French vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324.
Wagner vs. Baltimore, 239 U. S. 207, 219.
White vs. Tacoma, 109 Fed. 409.
Fay vs. Springfield, 94 Fed. 409.13p. 279.
'Zehnder vs. Barber Asphalt Co., 106 Fed. 107.
White vs. City of Tacoma, 109 Fed. 32, 33.
ui181 U. S. 324, affirming Barber Asphalt Paving Co. vs. French, 158 Mo.
534, 54 L. R. A. 492, 58 S. W. 934.
'p. 344.
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cluding not only the full amount paid for the strip condemned,
but the costs and expenses of the condemnation proceedings,
was thrown upon the abutting property of the person whose
land was condemned. This appeared, both to the court below
and to a majority of the judges of this court, to be an abuse
of the law, an act of confiscation, and not a valid exercise of the
taxing power. (Italics mine) * * *
"But there is no such state of facts in the present case.
"What was complained of was an orderly procedure under
a scheme of local improvements prescribed by the legislature
and approved by the courts of the State as consistent with
constitutional principles."
The court therefore held that the proceeding was due process
of law. 7
In White vs. City of Tacoma,8 the court says in regard to French
vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. and the cases following it (p. 32):
"In these several decisions the Supreme Court recognizes
the fact that the per front foot plan may be a perfectly fair
method of apportioning the burden of paying for street improve-
ments and that in cases in which it appears that assessments
levied according to that plan are not in excess of the benefits
to the property assessed, and are equal and fair, to that there
is no ground for complaining of actual injustice, the assessments
ire not necessarily in v:olation of the Constitution of the
United States merely because made according to the per front
foot plan; and it is shown that no such inflexible rule was
announced or intended by the court in its decision in the case
of Fillage of Norwood vs. Baker * * * ."
The front foot rule for paving has also been approved in later
cases.' 9  It has also been approved for water mains.2 0  The area
"7The dissenting opinion maintained that the procedure was unconstitutional
on the ground that Norwood vs. Baker controlled, and that a rule had been
prescribed excluding all inquiry into benefits.
11109 Fed. 33.
"9Tonawanda vs. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389.
Webster vs. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394.
Cass Farm Co., vs. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396.
Detroit vs. Parker, 181 U. S. 399.
King vs. Portland, 184 U. S. 61 (one-half of the cost assessed on adjoining
property.)
Chadwick vs. Kelly, 187 U. S. 540 (three-fourths of the cost.)
GAST VS. SCHNEIDER GRANITE CO., 240 U. S. 55, 1. c. 58.
Houck vs. Little River Drainage District, 239 U. S. 254, 265.
See also note in 28 L. R. A. (n. s.) at p. 1144.
"OParsons vs. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45.
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rule has been approved for sewer assessments.21  So it has been held
that the legislature may direct that the whole cost of an improve-
ment be levied on the lands benefited thereby.Y It has also been
held due process of law for Congress to assess one-half the cost of
a street opening on a benefit district."
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. vs. Barber Asphalt Paving
Co.Y Here a railroad company was assessed according to front
feet for the paving of a street in front of a lot in which its only interest
was a right-of-way for its main roadbed. It pleaded that neither
the right-of-way nor the lot would or could get any benefit from
the improvement, but would rather be harmed by the increase of
traffic. A demurrer to the plea was sustained. This was affirmed
by the Surpeme Court of the United States on the ground that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute exactness and
that the legislature is warranted in considering the land simply in
its general relations and apart from its particular use.
GA4ST REALTY AIND INVESTMENT CO. vs. SCHNEIDER
GRA4NITE CO.5 This case grew out of the paving of Broadway
in St. Louis. The tax was levied according to the charter which
provides that one-fourch of the total cost shall be levied upon all
the property fronting upon or adjoining the improvement accord-
ing to frontage, and three-fourths according to area upon a district
to be ascertained as follows: "A line shall be drawn midway between
the street to be improved and the next parallel or converging street
on each side of the street to be improved; which line shall be the
boundary of the district, except as hereinafter provided, namely:
If the property adjoining the street to be improved is divided into
21Shumate vs. Heman, 181 U. S. 402, affirming Heman vs. Allen, 156 Mo.
534 (a case of a district sewer in St. Louis.)
See also McGhee vs. Walsh, 249 Mo. 266.
"Spencer vs. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345.
"Briscoe vs. District of Columbia, 221 U. S. 547.
For other examples of assessments held due process see:
Williams vs. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304.
Fallbrook vs. Irrigation District, 164 U. S. 42.
Hagar vs. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701.
Phillip Wagner Inc. vs. Leser, 239 U. S. 207.
Embree vs. Kansas City & Liberty Bond Road District, 240 U. S. 242, 36
Sup. Ct. 317.
Kelly vs. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78.
St. Louis and Kansas City Lane Co., vs. Kansas City, 36 Sup. Co. 647-
U. S.-
Seattle vs. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351.
Soliah vs. Heskin, 222 U. S. 522.
u197 U. S. 430.
p240 U. S. 55, 36 Sup. Ct. 254, reversing Schneider Granite Co. vs. Gast
Realty and Investment Co., 259 Mo. 153.
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lots, the district line shall be so drawn as to include the entire depth
of all lots fronting on the street to be improved * * * . If
there is no parallel or converging street on either side 6f the street
improved, the district lines shall be drawn three hundred feet from
and parallel to the street to be improved; but if there be a parallel
or converging street on one side of the street to be improved to fix
and locate the district line, then the district line on the other side
shall be drawn parallel to the street to be improved and at the aver-
age distance of the 6pposite district line so fixed and located."
The district established according to the foregoing charter
provision was bounded by a line which "after running not a hundred
feet from the street, leaped to near five hundred feet when it encoun-
tered such a tract, and on the opposite side of the street was one
hundred and fifty and two hundred and forty feet away."25
This was held not to be "an incidental result of a rule that as
a whole and on the average may be expected to work well, but of
an ordinance that is a farrago of irrational irregularities through-
out."
The ordinance establishing the district wab, therefore, held to
be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Municipal Assembly as Legislative Body.
The question has been raised whether a municipal assembly
may apportion the benefits without giving a hearing which is re-
quired when a board or other subordinante body fixes the benefits.
In Heman vs. .llen,2 the municipal assembly of St. Louis
assessed the cost of a district sewer according to area on the sewer
district, without giving a hearing. This was held to be due process
of law by the Missouri court and was affirmed by the United States
Supreme court.2
Apportionment by Non-Legislative Body.
Where the State legislature determines the benefits a hearing
2240 U. S. I. c. 59.
2156 Mo. 534.28Shumate vs. Heman, 181 U. S. 402.
See also Barber Asphalt Paving Co. vs. French, 158 Mo. 534, 1. c. 547.
Bi-Metallic Co. vs. Colorado, 239 U. S. 441, 1. c. 445.
Farrar vs. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379.
Morse vs. Westport, 136 Mo. 276, 286.
Prior vs. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 451.
Paulsen vs. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 39.
Mullins vs. St. Mary's-Mo.-187 S. W. 1169.
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is not essential to due process of law.2 And where the legislature
prescribes a rule by which the benefit district and apportionment
are arbitrarily fixed, it is considered that the legislature has fixed
these things.*
But where the legislature delegates to a non-legislative body
its power to apportion the benefits, it is essential to due process of
law that notice and a hearing be given the property owner on matters
delegated.3
"There is a wide difference between a tax or assessment
prescribed by a legislative body, having full authority over
the subject, and one imposed by a municipal corporation. And
the difference is still wider between a legislative act making
an assessment, and the action of mere functionaries, whose
authority is derived from municipal ordinances.
3 2
The boards or commissioners to whom the fixing of benefits is
committed are considered to act in a quasi-judicial capacity, and
for this reason a hearing is required. 3
The legislature may determine some of the factors and leave
others to subordinate bodies, in which case there need be no hearing
on the part determined by the legislature.3 So, it is held that the
legislature may fix the total amount to be raised and direct that
it be apportioned on the several tracts of land according to benefits. 5
The body charged with the discretion of fixing the benefits must
not abuse the discretion. Although there is a hearing, it will not
be due process of law if the action of the taxing body is plainly arbi-
trary, any more than the action of the legislature would be due process
of law if it were plainly arbitrary.
*King vs. Portland, 184 U. S. 61.
Phillip Wagner Inc. vs. Leser, 239 TU. S. 207, 36 Sup. Ct. 66.
Parsons vs. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45.
Fallbrook Irrigation District vs. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112.
Carson vs. Brockton Sewerage Comm. 182 U. S. 398.
Webster vs. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394.
Tonawanda vs. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389.
King vs. Portland, 184 U. S. 61.
Williams vs. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304.
3"Chadwick vs. Kelley, 187 U. S. 540.
"'Embree vs. Kansas City Road Dist., 240 U. S. 242, 1. c. 247.
Fallbrook Irrigation District vs. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 167.
Parsons vs. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 1. c. 52 (semble.)
"Parsons vs. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 1. c. 51.
"Parsons vs. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 1. c. 52.
"4Phillip Wagner Inc. vs. Leser, 239 U. S. 207, 218.
"Bauman vs. Ross, 167 U. S. 548.
Briscoe vs. District of Columbia, 221 U. S. 547.
"Myles Salt Works vs. Iberia Drainage District, 239 U. S. 478.
"Bauman vs. Ross, 167 U. S. 548.
Briscoe vs. District of Columbia, 221 U. S. 547.
"Myles Salt Works vs. Iberia Drainage District, 239 U. S. 478.
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In the case last cited the Police Jury included in a drainage
district land which was so high that it could not be benefited. Plain-
tiff alleged that his property was included not for the purpose of
benefiting it but for the predetermined purpose of deriving revenue
therefrom. The inclusion was held to take property without due
process of law.
The hearing which is essential to due process of law where the
benefits are fixed by persons of delegated authority, need not come
at any particular time. If there is an opportunity to contest the
benefits when the property-owner is sued on the tax bills, this is a
sufficient hearing.Y
Time of Assessment.
The assessment need not be made before the improvement is
completed, nor need it be made under the provisions of the law under
which the improvement is constructed.
So, if the ordinance under which the improvement was con-
structed is void, an assessment may be had under a new ordinance
or a legislative permission granted after the work is completed."
Phillip Wagner Inc. vs. Leser, just cited, was a striking case
of this. The General Assembly enacted a statute providing that
a special tax be levied upon property in the City of Baltimore, bene-
fited by improved paving, of the amount specified, said tax to
continue as to each property for ten years from the time that it
attached thereto; the proceeds to be used for improved paving
as provided. The act further provided that all landed property
in Baltimore, adjoining or abutting upon any public highway,
which had been or should thereafter be paved with improved pav-
ing without special assessment was declared to be specially bene-
fited by. such improved paving to an extent greater than the entire
amount of the special tax levied under the act.
The objection was made that the act was unconstitutional
in providing for an assessment for benefits already received. The
OTHagar vs. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701.
2 Page & Jones, Taxation by Assessment, 1773.
Embree vs. Road District, 257 Mo. 593.
St. Louis vs. Richeson, 76 Mo. 470.
Walston vs. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578.
zPhillip Wagner Inc. vs. Leser, 239 U. S. 206, 36 Sup. Ct. 66.
Seattle vs. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351.
Spencer vs. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345.
Lombard vs. West Chicago Park Comm., 181 U. S. 33.55Cases in note 8 supra.
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court said the question was foreclosed by Seattle vs. Kelleher40 and
quoted from this case as follows, (p. 359):
"The principles of taxation are not those of contract. A
special assessment may be levied upon an executed considera-
tion, that is to say for a public work already done * * *
The court continued:
"As said in the Kelleher case (p. 359), 'the benefit was
there on the ground at the city's expense.' So far as any Federal
constitutional requirement is concerned, the State might exer-
cise its authority to assess because of this special benefit, al-
though that assessment was deferred for some time after the
work was done at public expense."
Some states" have provisions in their constitutions prohibiting
laws retrospective in their operation. Such a provision prohibits
an assessment under an ordinance or law passed after the improve-
ment is constructed. 42
RALPH R. NEUHOFF.
0195 U. S. 351.Const. Mo., Art. 2, 115.
dCity of St. Louis to use vs. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133.
See also Des Moines and Miss. Levee Dist. vs. C. B. & Q., 240 Mo. 614, 145
S. W. 35.
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